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Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the Hyundai Motor Group’s newly evolved-production 
structure to illustrate the evolution of a corporate system. Specifically, we explore why 
Hyundai Motor Group’s domestic-oriented production structure could be maintained until 
the more recent history of Korea’s domestic automobile market. Our findings show that 
since 2012, the Hyundai Motor Group’s production structure—which has been affected by 
internal and external factors in the automobile market—has transformed from a domestic-
oriented production structure to an overseas-oriented production structure. Our findings 
further demonstrate that both technical factors embedded in the Hyundai Motor Group’s 
production system and non-technical factors that strive to equate the production conditions 
in the Group’s foreign and domestic facilities support the smooth operation of the overseas-
oriented production structure. 
Keywords. Corporate system, Production structure, Automobile industry, Hyundai Motor 
Group, Evolutionary transformation. 
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1. Introduction 
ince the 1960s, the Korean government has implemented and enforced 
political strategies to promote the growth of the automobile industry in 
Korea. In that time, Korean automakers have sought to accept the strategy 
proposed by the government, thereby facilitating the prosperity and growth of the 
automobile industry. As a function of this prosperity and growth, in 2007, Korean 
automakers produced over four million vehicles for the first time. Since then, 
annual output of Korean automobiles has continued to increase despite a slump in 
the global automobile market. Owing to its sustained growth, Korea is in the 
process of solidifying its position as a major automobile-producing country within 
the global automobile market. As of 2013, Korea ranked fifth in terms of 
automobile production output, following China, the United States, Japan, and 
Germany. Of the various automakers within the Korean automobile industry, the 
Hyundai Motor Group (hereafter, the HM Group) has played a particularly integral 
role as a driving force of the industry’s global strength.  
The evolution of diverse forms of capitalism, coupled with environmental 
changes, have resulted in the emergence of a wide variety of corporate systems. In 
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seminal research that adopted an evolutionary framework to evaluate a specific 
automobile company, Fujimoto (1997a; 1999) explored the intrinsic evolutionary 
factors that contribute to the establishment, maintenance, and improvement of 
production systems within Toyota Motor Corporation. The main purpose of this 
paper is to explore the evolution of corporate production structures. To do so, we 
perform a case analysis on the HM Group as a proxy representative of Korea’s 
automobile industry. Specifically, we explore how HM Group’s production 
structure has evolved, why it has evolved into its current form, and how the newly 
evolved production structure can be maintained. Because HM Group’s production 
structure has undergone a complete transformation since 2012, an analysis thereof 
would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the HM Group’s corporate 
system, and by extension, the corporate systems of other Korean car manufacturers. 
This paper consists of three parts. In the first part, we examine how the HM 
Group’s domestic-oriented production structure (hereafter, DPS) could be 
maintained until 2011 and identify the factors that have historically affected the 
corporation’s production structure. The second part of the paper explores how the 
HM Group’s production structure could transform into its overseas-oriented 
production structure (hereafter, OPS). To do so, we investigate the corporation’s 
global strategy, as well the markets it has targeted. Finally, the third part of this 
paper highlights the technical and non-technical factors that make HM Group’s 
OPS (i.e., its newly evolved-production structure) operate smoothly. 
 
2. The evolution of production structure in the HM Group 
The HM Group,i an international automobile-specialized group in Korea, has 
produced the largest number of automobiles each year among the Korean 
companies. In 2012, the HM Group recorded its highest level of domestic output of 
automobiles since its foundation, with 3,490,946 vehicles. The Hyundai Motor 
Company (hereafter, HMC) produced roughly 54.6% of these nearly 3.5 million 
vehicles; Kia Motors Corporation (hereafter, KMC) produced the other 45.4%.ii In 
total, the HM Group accounted for 76.5% of the total domestic output of all 
automobiles produced by Korean automakers. Until a few years ago, HM Group’s 
production practices maintained a set structure, supplying automobiles to both 
domestic and overseas markets with automobiles produced domestically rather than 
in foreign facilities. This structure, however, proved untenable as a result of the 
influence of various factors. Ultimately, this caused the production structure to 
gradually evolve. Because corporations’ production structures evolve into a number 
of different forms in accordance with changes to the surrounding environment, 
evaluating the evolution of the HM Group’s production structure may lead to a 
more comprehensive understanding of its current production structure. 
2.1. Changes in the production structure specialization index 
Use of the production structure specialization index (hereafter, PSSI) iii  can 
reveal the types of production structures that the HM Group has maintained. PSSI 
score that is closer to 1.000 indicates a stronger the DPS, while a score closer to –
1.000 indicates a stronger the OPS. Using the PSSI is a methodological necessity to 
satisfactorily describe the evolution of production structures within the HM Group. 
Changes in HM Group’s PSSI scores clearly indicate that the Group’s production 
structure has evolved from a DPS to an OPS (see Figure 1). Delineating the process 
of HM Group’s evolution with regard to production structure (using PSSI scores) 
reveals that the evolution consists of three distinct periods. 
2.1.1. Maintaining the DPS 
The first period, which consists of HM Group’s history prior to 2005, was 
characterized by the corporation’s maintenance of a DPS. During this period, the 
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number of automobiles produced in domestic production facilities substantially 
exceeded the number of automobiles produced in production facilities located 
overseas. As a result, the HM Group’s PSSI score during this period remained 
between 0.500 and 1.000. Although HM Group’s PSSI score stayed between 0.500 
and 1.000 in this time frame, it did change over time. Specifically, the score 
gradually decreased from 0.920 in 2001 to 0.579 in 2005. 
2.1.2. Escaping the DPS 
In 2006, the HM Group’s PSSI score dropped below 0.500 for the first time. 
This continuous decline caused the HM Group to enter into the second phase of its 
production structure evolution—the “escape period from the DPS.” During this 
period, which lasted from 2006 through 2011, the HM Group’s PSSI score stayed 
between 0.000 and 0.500. Using the PSSI framework to define the evolutionary 
phase in which the HM Group operated in this time period, it is clear that although 
HM Group’s PSSI score was declining, it nevertheless maintained a positive score 
over these six years. As a consequence, it is fair to claim that the HM Group 
continued to employ the DPS lasted over this time period. However, this time 
period is distinct from the “maintaining” period of the DPS (i.e., 2005 and earlier) 
given the rapid and continuous decrease in PSSI score. Between 2006 and 2011, 
the HM Group experienced an annual average increase in domestic output of 
automobiles of 4.7%. Average annual growth in overseas output was markedly 
higher, reaching 25.5%. The extent of this gap between foreign and domestic 
output indicates that the transformation of the HM Group’s production structure 
occurred quickly in the years following this period. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: The HM Group: Global automobile output, PSSI 
Note: 1. The annual domestic and overseas annual production volume of automobiles is equal to the 
sum of HMC’s and KMC’s, respective production volumes (including passenger and commercial 
vehicles).2. PSSI score is based on these data. 
Source: Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, Korean Automobile Industry, Hyundai Motor 
Company, Sustainability Report, Annual Report, Kia Motors Corporation, Kia Motors Sustainability 
Magazine, Annual Report. 
 
2.1.3. Transitioning to the OPS 
After the “escape period,” the PSSI score continuously decreased until it finally 
transformed from a positive value to a negative value in 2012. In 2012, the annual 
output of automobiles produced in overseas production facilities exceeded the 
number produced in domestic production facilities. As such, in 2012, the HM 
Group can be said to have transitioned from the DPS to the OPS. As of 2013, the 
HM Group has maintained the OPS, with the PSSI score of – 0.093. 
2.2. The specificity of Korea’s domestic automobile market 
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Although historic PSSI scores illustrate the evolution of the HM Group’s 
production structure numerically, accurate interpretation of these scores requires a 
nuanced understanding of Korea’s domestic automobile market. Further, by 
developing an understanding of the structural features of Korea’s domestic 
automobile market, it is possible to determine why the HM Group’s transformation 
to the OPS experienced such delay. 
In the early 1960s, the Korean government identified the country’s automobile 
industry as a driving force the Korean economy and bolstered it through political 
strategy. As part of the strategy, the Korean government enforced import 
restrictions on foreign brand automobiles to protect the Korean automobile 
industry. These import restrictions were enforced until the end of 1986. However, 
as automakers in advanced countries requested the liberalization of Korean imports 
to facilitate their entrance into the Korean automobile industry, the Korean 
government eased regulations on importing foreign automobiles imports in January 
of 1987. Ultimately, this led to the opening of the Korean market to foreign 
automakers for large (2.0 liter engines) and small (1.0 liter engines and smaller) 
automobiles on a preferential basis. In April of 1988, the Korean government lifted 
import restrictions on all types of foreign brand automobiles (regardless of engine 
displacements). As a result, the market for foreign brand automobiles in Korea was 
fully opened at that time. 
Figure 2 illustrates the domestic market share of brand-new passenger vehicles 
in Korea. Specifically, we calculated the total annual sales volume of brand-new, 
foreign-brand automobiles (hereafter, BFA) and brand-new, Korean-brand 
automobiles (hereafter, BKA). Although, BFA held only a 0.004% market share in 
the Korean automobile market in 1987, this figure great to 12.1% by 2013 as a 
result of the eased restrictions on the import of foreign brand automobiles. 
Although BFAs have claimed an increasingly large portion of the market share in 
the Korean automobile market since 1987, this share is still far lower than that of 
BKAs. As of 2013, the HM Group’s annual sales volume of passenger vehicles in 
Korea’s domestic automobile market was 882,654 vehicles, reflecting 68.2% of the 
Korean automobile market. The high market share retained by the HM Group 
demonstrates that despite steps to open the Korean automobile market to foreign 
automakers, the market remains to be most heavily populated by domestic 
automakers. 
The Korean domestic automobile market has been dominated by Korean 
automakers is related to the Korean government’s active support of and strategic 
policies toward domestic automakers, as well as the imposition of high tariffs on 
BFA. Before 1987, there was no influx of BFA into Korea’s domestic automobile 
market; therefore, the market could be occupied entirely by domestic automakers. 
Although there has been a steady influx of BFA into the Korean automobile market 
since 1987, the price competitiveness of domestic automakers has been artificially 
strengthened as a result of the aforementioned tariffs on BFA, thereby allowing 
domestic automakers to retain the majority of the market.  
The Korean government’s policies facilitated domestic automakers’ domination 
of the domestic automobile market in Korea. Owing to the influence of the 
institutional factors outlined above, HMC and KMCP iv —which had a higher 
production capacity than other domestic automakers—could be in a key position to 
capture the majority of the domestic automobile market. This also afforded HMC 
and KMCP the opportunity to focus its energy and resources on Korea’s domestic 
market for a long time. As a result, the transformation of their production structure 
into the OPS was delayed. 
 
 JEPE, 2(2), W. J. Kim, p.235-261. 
238 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 
FIGURE 2: Domestic market share for brand new passenger vehicles, tariff rate 
Note: 1. Sales of recreational vehicles are included in this figure. 2. Sales volume of Hyundai 
Precision Industry Co. Ltd., which belonged to Hyundai Group through HMC, is included in the 
HMC data from 1987 through 2000. Sales volume of Asia Motors Co. Ltd., which was merged with 
KMC, is included in the KMC data from 1987 through 2000. 3. From 2001 onward (when the HM 
Group was founded), total sales volume is equal to the sum of HMC and KMC’s respective sales 
volumes. 4. The tariff rate on BFA in January of 1988 was 40%; the tariff rate on BFA in March of 
1988 was 30%. Therefore, we calculated the tariff rate in 1988 to be 35%. 5. HMC’s and KMC’s 
respective market shares were calculated by the author. 
Source: Korea Automobile Importers and Distributors Association (2015), Korea Customs 
Service,Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2005), Hyundai Motor Company, 
Sustainability Report,Annual Report, Kia Motors Corporation,Kia Motors Sustainability 
Magazine,Annual Report. 
 
2.3. A delay in reaching maturity of the diffusion of the passenger vehicle 
The rapid development of the Korean economy in the 1980s and 1990s 
contributed to a rise in the gross national income within Korea. This, in turn, 
resulted in the growth of Koreans’ purchasing power, allowing them to more easily 
purchase passenger vehicles. As a result, there was an increase in the diffusion of 
passenger vehicles in Korea. In Korea, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by 
a gradual increase in demand for passenger vehicles, contrary to business 
fluctuations. As such, this period can be defined as the stage just before the 
diffusion of the passenger vehicle achieved maturity in Korea. Therefore, by 
retaining the majority share of Korea’s domestic automobile market during this 
period, HMC and KMCP could secure a reliable source demand for their 
automobiles in the long-run. 
Figure 3 shows that as Korean GNI per capita gradually increased into the mid-
1990s, HMC and KMCP’s domestic sales of brand new passenger vehicles also 
increased. The rapid increase in sales volume is largely attributable to a rise in the 
gross national income, which supported a continuous increase in demand for brand 
new passenger vehicles. This means that the diffusion of the passenger vehicle 
could not reach maturity in Korea before 1996. This is in stark contrast to the case 
of Japan, where diffusion of the passenger vehicle reached maturity as early as 
1990.v The delayed growth in GNI explains why relative to Japan’s Toyota Group, 
the HM Group was delayed in transforming to the OPS. From the perspective of 
HMC and KMCPmanagement, there was no incentive to abandon the DPS before 
Korea entered the maturity stage of the diffusion of the passenger vehicle. In other 
words, HMC and KMCP had no incentive to dedicate resources to secure new 
purchasing demand or cultivate overseas markets, as a large increase in demand for 
passenger vehicles within Korea’s domestic automobile market had occurred by 
1996. Given these conditions, HMC and KMCPfound Korea’s domestic automobile 
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market to be more attractive than foreign markets. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Total annual sales volume of passenger vehicles in Korea’s domestic market, 
Korea’s GNI per capita 
Note: The annual sales volume of BFA is not included in the total annual sales volume of passenger 
vehicles. 
Source: The World Bank, International Comparison Program database, Korea Automobile Importers 
and Distributors Association (2015), Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2003; 2005), 
Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, Korean Automobile Industry. 
 
2.4. Saturation of demand for brand new Korean passenger vehicles in Korea’s 
domestic automobile market 
Figure 3 demonstrates that diffusion of passenger vehicles within Korea’s 
domestic automobile market has been in a stage of maturity since 1996. Since the 
early 1990s, the sales volume of brand-new, Korean-brand passenger vehicles 
(hereafter, BKP) in Korea’s domestic automobile market had been increasing 
exponentially. This ultimately led to a peak sales volume of 1,238,940 vehicles in 
1996. Although the pre-1996 increase in sales volume was largely impervious to 
business fluctuations, after hitting its peak in 1996, sales volume became sensitive 
to the fluctuations to which it had previously been immune. 
To illustrate, Figure 3 shows that there was a rapid decline in demand for BKP 
in Korea’s domestic automobile market after 1996. This decline is most directly 
attributable to the economic recession related to the 1997 IMF Financial Crisis in 
1997. Another driver of this decline was reduced consumer confidence relate to 
Korea’s 2003 Credit Card Crisis, as well as uncertainty in the international 
economy resulting from increases in the price for oil (which itself was linked to the 
Iraq War). During periods of economic stagnation, durable goods (a category of 
which passenger vehicles are a part) are more drastically affected than other types 
of goods. Therefore, as a result of these factors, the total annual sales volume of 
BKP in Korea’s domestic automobile market decreased by 50.7% from 1997 to 
1998, and 14.4% from 2003 to 2004. 
Given this, it may be argued that Korea’s domestic automobile market has 
already reached maturity in terms of passenger vehicle saturation. This claim is 
validated by the fact that although there were two periods of economic recovery in 
Korea since 1996, demand for BKP has not increased more than a certain level 
during either of these periods. This indicates that despite economic recovery, 
demand for BKP in Korea’s domestic automobile market has a specific upward 
limit. Still, demand for BKP has not exceeded roughly 1.23 million vehicles in the 
past 16 years. 
It is clear from the above that a saturation of demand for BKP has exerted a 
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strong effect on the change in the HM Group’s transformation of production 
structure to the OPS. By acknowledging that demand for BKP in Korea’s domestic 
automobile market has little potential for increase, the HM Group has realized its 
domestic production facilities are capable of handling Korean demand for BKP. 
Therefore, the HM Group began to increase investments in overseas production 
facilities to cultivate an overseas market. 
2.5. Emerging economies: the rapid growth of the automobile market 
Unlike Korea’s passenger vehicle market, which reached its upper limit in terms 
of demand in the mid-1990s, the respective markets for passenger vehicles in 
China, India, Brazil and RSCT (Russia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and 
Turkey), which constitute emerging economies (hereafter, EEs), have expanded 
rapidly since the early 2000s. This expansion is the result of increased income, 
which accompanied economic growth in those countries (which had yet to reach 
the maturity stage of passenger vehicle diffusion). This trend illustrates that the 
diffusion of passenger vehicles attributable to economic growth in EEs is rapidly 
increasing. This rapid increase has motivated the HM Group to expand its business 
and establish new production facilities in EEs, where there is a large demand for 
new automobiles. This incursion into foreign markets also served as a catalyst for 
transforming the HM Group’s production structure into the OPS.  
 
3. The transformation to the OPS 
Automakers attempt to boost overseas production through the development and 
use of production facilities on foreign soil as a result of the unique features of the 
automobile industry itself. Unlike electronic goods, which cost less to import, 
automobiles are characterized by high logistic costs owing to extensive supply 
chains. To mitigate these costs, it is advisable for automakers to build production 
facilities that are geographically near the markets in which the automobiles will be 
sold. In addition, because the automobile industry (relative to other industries) has 
a substantial effect on employment, it is often protected by government policies 
(e.g., tariffs), thereby limiting the growth of automakers without accompanying 
overseas production facilities. Moreover, cultural, historical, environmental, and 
institutional factors have effectively diversified consumer preferences for 
automobiles. Therefore, it is critical to locate production facilities near the 
automobile markets they serve to accommodate these unique preferences.  
3.1. Business strategy for glocalization: changes in automobile supply route to 
overseas market 
As of 2013, the total number of automobiles produced in the HM Group’s 
global production facilities was 7,602,445 vehicles. About 6.46 million (85%) of 
these vehicles were supplied to overseas markets. Of the 7.6 million vehicles 
produced by the HM Group, about 2.3 million vehicles in domestic production 
facilities were directly exported to overseas markets. Nearly 4.2 million vehicles 
were produced in the HM Group’s overseas facilities and were supplied to various 
countries. These figures reveal that the HM Group’s supply of automobiles to 
foreign markets is accommodated by both exports from the Group’s Korean 
facilities as well as its international production facilities. 
It is essential to understand the current state of the HM Group’s automobile 
supply routes. However, how the HM Group’s supply routes have evolved is no 
less important. Therefore, it is important to note the ratio of automobiles produced 
for direct export from Korea to automobiles produced in international facilities has 
changed in the last 13 years. 
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FIGURE 4: HM Group’s automobile supply route to the overseas market 
Note: 1. Export volume of Asia Motors Co. Ltd., which was merged into KMC, is included in the 
KMC data from 1980 to 1999. 2. Both overseas output and export volume consist of the sum of 
passenger and commercial vehicles; the number of knockdown vehicles is excluded from export 
volume. 
Source: Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2005), Korea Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, Korean Automobile Industry, Korea Automotive Research Institute, Korean Automotive 
Industry, Hyundai Motor Company, Sustainability Report,Annual Report, Kia Motors Corporation, 
Kia Motors Sustainability Magazine,Annual Report. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the stage-by-stage process through which the HM Group’s 
automobile supply route to overseas markets has evolved. This figure shows that 
the supply route has evolved such that it consists of three historical stages. First, 
from 1975 to 2000, HMC and KMCP supplied their domestically built automobiles 
to overseas markets through direct export only, as the HM Group had yet to 
develop overseas production facilities to this point. Since 2001, however, when 
HMC and KMCPmerged into the HM Group, the companies have simultaneously 
exported domestically built automobiles and produced vehicles at its overseas 
production facilities. This change marked a business strategy referred to as 
“glocalization” which the HM Group had sought to implement since its 
establishment.vi As part of the HM Group’s glocalization strategy, the corporation 
founded the Beijing Hyundai Motor Company and Dongfeng Yueda Kia Motor 
Company, Ltd. in 2002. It was when these two companies were founded that 
automobile production at China’s production facilities began in earnest. Between 
2001 and 2008, the HM Group increased production of automobiles in their Korean 
facilities. These vehicles were intended to be exported to overseas markets; 
production of exported automobiles increased an average of 5.5% over this period. 
Nevertheless, production of automobiles for overseas markets increased more 
rapidly in overseas production facilities, where the average annual production 
increase was 46.9%. Despite outpacing the annual growth of Korean production of 
exported automobiles by such a substantial margin, the number of automobiles 
produced at overseas production facilities did not exceed the number of 
automobiles exported to foreign markets from HM Group’s Korean production 
facilities. Notwithstanding, the HM Group continued its gradual expansion of 
investment in overseas production facilities. As a result, the corporation founded 
several global business sites since the mid-2000s. An increase in direct investment 
to overseas production facilities allowed those facilities to produce a greater 
number of automobiles. As a result, by 2009 (and beyond), the output of HM 
0
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
- 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 
O
verseas output
Export volume
2000
2013
2009
2008
1975
Overseas > Export
Overseas < Export
2001
45° line
(Unit: 1,000 vehicles)
 JEPE, 2(2), W. J. Kim, p.235-261. 
242 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
Group’s overseas production facilities had exceeded the output of the Group’s 
Korean facilities. Given this, it is clear that in 2009, the HM Group’s automobile 
supply route changed drastically. 
3.2. Evolution into a multinational corporation 
As evidenced by changes in HM Group’s activities leading up to 2009, the 
Group’s automobile supply route to overseas markets evolved from a direct export-
oriented route to a hybrid route characterized by a combination of direct exports 
from Korea and the production of automobiles in overseas facilities. One salient 
characteristic of the HM Group’s automobile supply route is its gradually 
decreasing ratio of automobiles produced for direct export from Korea to its 
vehicles produced in overseas production facilities. This changing ratio indicates 
that by increasing investment in overseas production facilities, the HM Group has 
been evolving into a multinational corporation. 
Although there is no clear consensus definition of a multinational corporation, 
multiple researchers have defined and operationalized its components.vii Using the 
work of these researchers as a guide, a multinational corporation can be defined as 
a corporation that owns or controls overseas-affiliated companies that engage in 
production activities at global manufacturing bases located outside the borders of 
the corporation’s home country. Generally, multinational corporations utilize 
overseas direct investment to partake in production and marketing activities on a 
global scale. To successfully execute such a strategy, multinational corporations 
establish global business sites in various countries that possess their stocks or 
actual assets. 
From this perspective, a gradual expansion of global business sites through 
overseas direct investment indicates a firm’s gradual evolution into a multinational 
corporation. Therefore, because the HM Group has continued overseas direct 
investment to establish and maintain various global business sites, it appears as 
though it is undergoing the gradual process of evolving into a multinational 
corporation. According to HMC’s2013 sustainability reportsand Kia Motors 
Sustainability Magazine 2013, HMC’s operations in six countries (excluding 
Korea) included six production facilities, three production-sales corporations, 16 
sales corporations, six R&D centers, nine regional headquarters and two special 
facilities. KMC’s operations in three countries (excluding Korea) included three 
production facilities, 18 sales corporations, nine R&D and design centers, and four 
regional headquarters. 
 
TABLE 1. Number of workers employed at HMC’s and KMC’s global business sites 
(Unit: 1 person, %) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 CAGR 
HMC      
 India 5,511 5,795 8,816 8,893 17.3% 
 China 7,443 9,625 13,768 15,631 28.1% 
 U.S 5,005 5,149 6,211 6,873 11.2% 
 Europe 3,974 6,499 5,991 6,031 14.9% 
 Others 1,791 2,057 3,532 4,410 35.0% 
  Total 23,724 29,125 38,318 41,838 20.8% 
KMC      
 China 5,003 5,097 6,095 6,327 8.1% 
 U.S 2,389 3,355 3,174 3,177 10.0% 
 Europe 3,853 4,167 4,794 4,731 7.1% 
 Others 110 137 120 273 35.4% 
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 Total 11,355 12,756 14,183 14,553 8.6% 
Notes: CAGR is compound annual growth rate. 
Source: Hyundai Motor Company, Sustainability Report,Annual Report, Kia Motors Corporation,Kia 
Motors Sustainability Magazine,Annual Report. 
 
In addition to the increased output associated with overseas production 
facilities, increasing direct overseas investment on the part of HM Group is also 
evidenced by the growing number of workers employed at these global business 
sites. In 2013, HMC’s global business sites employed almost 42,000 workers, 
which was a 9.2% increase relative to the previous year. In that same year, KMC’s 
global business sites employed about 14,500 workers, which was 2.6% higher than 
in 2012 (See Table 1). Although the growth of each site’s workforce varies from 
region to region, there has been a marked increase in the number of workers 
employed at HMC and KMC’s overseas facilities since 2010. From 2010 to 2013, 
the average increase in the number of workers at the HM Group’s Chinese and 
Indian facilities has been higher than in the United States and Europe. This serves 
as further evidence that HM Group has focused on these EEs since 2010. 
The HM Group’s active investment in overseas production facilities has resulted 
in increased output from those facilities. Most notably, between 2011 and 2013, the 
HM Group dedicated its largest investments to Hyundai Motor India (HMI), 
followed by Hyundai Motor Brasil (HMB) (See Table 2). As a result of this, HMI 
has increased by its output by over 13,000 vehicles between 2011 and 2013. 
Similarly, HMB increased its output by nearly 140,000 vehicles between 2012 and 
2013.viii 
Overall, it appears that the HM Group’s glocalization strategy features an 
emphasis on overseas direct investment. This emphasis has yielded an expansion of 
overseas production facilities and an increase in not only the number of 
automobiles produced, but also the number of workers employed. As a 
consequence of these steps, the HM Group evolved into a multinational corporation 
in a short period of time. As a result of its transformation, the HM Group engages 
in production and marketing activities through global manufacturing bases in 
various countries. The HM Group’s evolution into a multinational corporation 
further indicates that its production structure has similarly evolved into the OPS. 
 
TABLE 2. Investment in overseas production facilities (Unit: 100 million KRW) 
 2011 2012 2013 2011-2013 
America     
 HMMA 1,527 947 1,281 3,755 
 KMMG 2,399 1,902 956 5,257 
 HMB 2,321 2,402 1,237 5,960 
Europe     
 HMMR 1,376 107 161 1,644 
 KMS 2,585 1,446 754 4,785 
 HMMC 1,693 1,304 377 3,374 
 HAOS 91 999 1,023 2,113 
Asia     
 HMI 1,912 2,997 2,493 7,402 
Total 13,904 12,104 8,282 34,290 
Notes: These data are based on the cost of investments in plants and equipment; research and 
development costs are not included. 
Source:Hyundai Motor Company, Sustainability Report,Annual Report, Kia Motors Corporation,Kia 
Motors Sustainability Magazine,Annual Report. 
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3.3. Concentration on emerging economies 
As the markets for passenger vehicles have expanded in EEs, so too have the 
HM Group’s automobile production rates (or output) in its overseas production 
facilities (see Figure 5). The following subsections detail the nature of those 
expansions. 
3.3.1. China 
In China, the domestic market for passenger vehicles has expanded for much of 
the last 12 years. As a result of this expansion, China represents the largest 
domestic market for passenger vehicles among all EEs. In 2001, the total annual 
sales volume of brand new passenger vehicles in China’s domestic market was only 
about 721,000 vehicles. By 2013, however, this figure had increased by almost 25 
times to nearly 18 million vehicles. In addition, the automobile production rate of 
HM Group’s Chinese production facilities has increased from 0.4% in 2001 to 
21.5% in 2013. 
3.3.2. India 
Similar to China, the Indian domestic market for passenger vehicles has 
expanded drastically in the last decade. As of 2013, the total annual sales volume of 
new passenger vehicles in India’s domestic market was over 2.5 million vehicles. 
This represents a more than four-fold increase from the annual sales volume in 
2001. The rate at which India’s facilities produce automobiles has increased as 
well. In 2001, HM Group’s Indian production facility’s production rate was 3.6%. 
By 2013, this figure had grown to 8.4%.  
3.3.3. RSCT 
By 2008, the sales volume of passenger vehicles in RSCT had experienced 
significant growth. However, in 2009, sales volumes decreased sharply as Russia 
was significantly impacted by the global financial crisis of 2008. Other than this 
anomaly, however, it is apparent that the domestic market for passenger vehicles in 
the RSCT has generally undergone (and continues to undergo) expansion. The total 
annual sales volume for RSCT in 2013 was 3,493,111 vehicles. This is more than 
double the amount of vehicles sold in RSCT in 2001. In addition, the automobile 
production rate in the HM Group’s RSCT production facilities has increased from 
1.7% in 2005 to 12.5% in 2013. 
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FIGURE 5: Total annual sales volume of brand new passenger vehicles in EEs, 
production rates in HM Group’s production facilities by regional groups 
Source: FOURIN, Inc. (2013), OICA (2014a; 2014b)Hyundai Motor Company, Sustainability 
Report,Annual Report, Kia Motors Corporation,Kia Motors Sustainability Magazine,Annual Report. 
 
3.3.4. Brazil 
Consistent with the other EEs described above, the passenger vehicle market is 
expanding in Brazil as well. In 2013, the total annual sales volume of brand new 
passenger vehicles in the Brazilian domestic market nearly 2.8 million vehicles, 
representing a 2.3-fold increase from the recorded sales volume in 2001. HM 
Group’s Brazilian production facility, which produced its first automobile in 2012, 
produced 0.4% of the HM Group’s total output in that year. In 2013, however, this 
rate increased to 2.2%. 
3.3.5. Features of EEs 
The EEs described above share three common attributes. First, each of these 
countries is characterized by an increasing GNI per capita. Second, each of their 
respective domestic markets for passenger vehicles is expanding. Third, the HM 
Group’s production facilities in these EEs has undergone (and continues to 
undergo) an increase in the rate at which they produce automobiles. These 
attributes exist as parts of a causal system, which can be defined as follows. 
Increases in EEs’ GNI per capita generate an increase in purchasing demand for 
brand new passenger vehicles. This increased demand has caused the domestic 
market for passenger vehicles to expand within EEs, thereby prompting the HM 
Group to increase the rate at which its overseas production facilities produce 
vehicles. As a result, the HM Group’s PSSI score has sharply decreased since the 
mid-2000s. These features of EEs have had an enduring effect on HM Group’s 
production strategies. Specifically, they have induced the HM Group to address 
new purchasing demands in EEs rather than exclusively focus on a Korean market 
that had reached saturation of demand for BKP. 
3.4. External features of the automobile market in EEs 
Although the automobile markets in the EEs share some commonalities, they 
also have unique features that distinguish them. Most notably, the production 
facilities can be delineated on the basis of the number of automobiles they supply 
to their own domestic markets. On the basis of this standard, the EEs’ markets can 
be classified as being one of three types: “the third world market-supplying type,” 
“the domestic market-centralized type,” or “the third world market-dependent 
type.” How the markets are classified indirectly demonstrates the role automakers’ 
production facilities play in EEs (e.g., production bases for third-world domestic 
market or their own domestic market). Figure 6 shows how OICA statistics guide 
the calculation of the Supply Concentration Index (hereafter, SCI)ix. Specifically, 
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the external feature of each country’s respective automobile market is quantified by 
calculating an SCI score, which falls between –1.000 and 1.000. SCI scores closer 
to –1.000 indicate that a tendency towards a third-world, market-dependent type. A 
score close to 0 indicates a tendency towards a domestic market-centralized type. 
Finally, an SCI score that is close to 1.000 indicates a tendency towards the third 
world market-supplying type. 
3.4.1. Slovakia, the Czech Republic 
The calculation of SCI scores indicated that the automobile markets in Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic are of the third-world, market-supplying type. As of 2013, 
Slovakia’s SCI was 0.857, the highest score among EEs. The Czech Republic 
recorded the second-highest score (0.719). Slovakia’s SCI score has consistently 
been over 0.448, and the Czech Republic’s SCI score has consistently been higher 
than 0.548. Taken together, these figures indicate that automakers’ production 
facilities in both countries serve as production bases for third-world domestic 
markets rather than their own domestic markets. 
3.4.2. Turkey 
In 2013, Turkey recorded an SCI score of 0.115, identifying the Turkish market 
as being the third-world, market-supplying type. Given that Turkey has maintained 
an SCI score higher than 0.103 for a significant period of time, it appears that 
automakers’ production facilities in Turkey serve as production bases for third-
world domestic markets as well. However, Turkey’s SCI score has never exceed 
0.400, suggesting that Turkish automakers do not supply vehicles to third-world 
domestic markets to the same degree as Slovakia or the Czech Republic’s 
automakers. 
3.4.3. India, China 
On the basis of their SCI scores, India and China can be categorized as being of 
the domestic market-centralized type. Specifically, India and China had SCI scores 
of 0.090 and 0.003, respectively. Between 2005 and 2013, India’s SCI score 
remained between 0.064 and 0.090; China’s score remained between –0.004 and 
0.006, thereby indicating that most automobiles produced in India and China are 
consumed in their own domestic markets.  
 
 
 2005 0.488 0.548 0.103 0.064 –0.004 0.192 –0.143 
 2006 0.559 0.646 0.230 0.071 –0.002 0.151 –0.196 
 2007 0.730 0.639 0.298 0.061 0.005 0.095 –0.272 
 2008 0.698 0.629 0.398 0.081 –0.004 0.066 –0.286 
 2009 0.665 0.681 0.219 0.076 0.005 0.007 –0.376 
 2010 0.768 0.704 0.180 0.078 0.006 –0.019 –0.201 
 2011 0.783 0.720 0.158 0.089 –0.002 –0.032 –0.186 
 2012 0.840 0.718 0.135 0.071 –0.001 –0.064 –0.169 
 2013 0.857 0.719 0.115 0.090 0.003 –0.004 –0.151 
 
FIGURE 6: Changes in supply concentration index in EEs 
Source: Computed by the author by using the data from OICA (2013a; 2013b). 
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3.4.4. Brazil 
Brazil’s SCI score has steadily decreased from 0.192 in 2005 to –0.004 in 2013. 
As the only country to experience a shift from positive to negative SCI, Brazil has 
transformed from a third-world, market-supplying type to a third world market-
dependent type. As the total sales volume of automobiles in Brazil’s domestic 
market began to exceed its production facilities’ output (in 2010), the lack of 
automobile supplies has forced Brazilian automakers to rely more heavily on the 
third-world market. 
3.4.5. Russia 
Finally, Russia’s automobile market is of the third-world, market-dependent 
type. Russia recorded the lowest SCI score among the EEs mentioned above. 
Specifically, Russia’s SCI score decreased to –0.376 in 2009, but increased to –
0.151 by 2013. Relative to the other EEs, the Russian case is notable because of the 
country’s consistently negative SCI scores from 2005 to 2013. This indicates that 
Russian production facilities are unable to satisfy demand for automobiles in their 
own domestic market. As a result, unsatisfied demand for automobiles is often 
addressed by suppliers from third-world nations. 
3.5. The HM Group’s strategy in EEs’ automobile markets 
Although the SCI helps to quantify the external features of EEs’ automobile 
markets, there is a limit to the extent to which the intrinsic features of a market can 
be understood by looking exclusively at external characteristics. Therefore, it is 
necessary to also explore the internal features of automobile markets. 
Unlike their external features, the internal features of EEs’ automobile markets 
can be defined in terms of consumer purchasing patterns within their own domestic 
markets. To this end, the most popular (i.e., best-selling) segment of automobiles in 
each market serves to illustrate the markets’ internal features.x Automakers make 
decisions about the segments of the automobile market on which they wish to 
dedicate sources for production and sales strategies based on the market’s internal 
features. 
  
  
FIGURE 7: HM Group’s global plant sales in EEs’ domestic markets 
Source:  Hyundai Motor Company (2014), Kia Motors Corporation (2014). 
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3.5.1. China 
In 2012, 80.6% (about 15.5 million vehicles) of all automobile sales in China’s 
domestic market were passenger vehicles.xiThe C-segment represented the highest 
proportion of sales (29.6%), followed by M-segment (15.2%), B-segment (11.8%), 
D-segment (11.0%), J-segment (10.5%), and A-segment (2.5%). Within China’s 
domestic automobile market, consumer purchasing patterns are generally spread 
out over multiple segments. However, customer purchases were largely centralized 
within the small- and medium-sized vehicle segment. The HM Group has 
attempted to increase its market share in various segments by diversifying 
automobile-production models and focusing on the production and sales of B- and 
C-segment automobiles. Moreover, in response to the sudden rise in demand for 
automobiles in China, the HM Group uses its Chinese production facilities to 
supply vehicles to consumers there. 
3.5.2. India 
In 2012, 77.2% (nearly 2.8 million vehicles) of all automobile sales in India 
were passenger vehicles. xii Further, in the Indian automobile market, A- and B-
segment automobiles accounted for the highest proportion of sales (47.2%), 
followed by J-segment (14.3%), C- and D-segment (13.5%), and M-segment 
(6.7%). The most notable characteristic of India’s domestic automobile market is 
the marked tendency for consumers to gravitate towards vehicles in the mini- and 
small-sized vehicle segment. Although there economic growth in India has given 
rise to its national income, its national income remains relatively low in 
comparison to other advanced countries. As a result, demand for cheaper mini- and 
small-sized vehicles more pronounced then demand for mid- and large-sized 
vehicles. Through HMI, the HM Group has developed and implemented a strategy 
of producing and selling mini- and small-sized vehicles as a means to target India’s 
domestic automobile market. Given the high demand for mini- and small-sized 
vehicles in India, HMI produces these vehicles in its production facility. 
3.5.3. Brazil 
In 2012, 75.0% (about 2.85 million) of all automobile sales in Brazil’s domestic 
market were attributed to passenger vehicles. xiii The sales of passenger vehicles 
with engine displacements of more than 1,000cc and less than 2,000cc, which are 
equivalent to the aforementioned B- and C-segment automobiles, accounted for the 
highest percentage (43.2%) of Brazilian automobile sales. Vehicles with engine 
displacements of less than 1,000cc (equivalent to A-segment vehicles) were the 
second-most popular automobile in terms of sales (31.2% of all sales). Brazil’s 
automobile market is largely characterized by two features. First, consumers 
largely prefer small and medium-sized vehicles of the B and C-segment. Second, 
Brazilian consumers purchase a large number of vehicles that run on Flex Fuel. Of 
the 3.64 million passenger and light commercial vehicles sold in Brazil in 2012, 
3.16 million (about 87%) were Flex Fuel vehicles. The HM Group’s Brazilian 
production facility (HMB) began producing vehicles in 2012, and now produces 
only one automobile model to address consumer demands in Brazil—the B-
Segment Flex Fuel-powered vehicle. 
3.5.4. RSCT 
In 2012, 87.1% (nearly 3.73 million vehicles) of all automobile sales in RSCT 
were passenger vehicles. xiv  Within RCST, consumer purchasing patterns are 
generally spread across various vehicle segments. However, much like some of the 
other EEs mentioned above, RCST consumers tend to concentrate their purchasing 
behaviors on small- and medium-sized vehicles of the B- and C-segments. Within 
RSCT, the top 25 best-selling automobiles in each market captured between 48.7% 
and 57.8% of total automobile sales.xv More than half of these 25 models are B- 
and C-segment automobiles, which account for between 30.6% and 41.2% of total 
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automobile sales. Given these unique features of the RSCT market, the HM Group 
has made a concentrated effort to produce and sell the highly demanded B-, C-, and 
J-segment automobiles. 
 
4. The operation of the OPS 
The HM Group’s global business strategy is based the optimal use of its 
overseas facilities as bases from which to supply automobiles to foreign markets. 
By structuring its production facilities in this fashion, the HM Group is capable of 
immediately coping with purchasing demands not only in the countries in which its 
facilities are located, but in the neighboring countries as well (Jung 2011). The HM 
Group has undergone continuous growth in terms of production volume and sales 
since 2000. As a result, it has simultaneously increased its global market share as 
well as the number of automobiles it produces in its overseas facilities. The 
persistent increase in production at its overseas facilities indicates that the 
transformation of the HM Group’s automobile-production structure has 
transformed with relative ease; to date, the OPS is operating smoothly. Although 
various factors contribute to the smooth operation of the OPS, the HM Group’s 
unique production system is the most integral.  
4.1. Non-technical factors (I): an exclusive supply relationship between an 
automaker and a module maker 
The HM Group’s production system, which can be regarded as a “keiretsu-
based Integrated Production System” (hereafter, keiretsu-based IPS), facilitates not 
only the production of basic automobile frames and core auto-components, but also 
the assembly of automobiles within the Group (Kim 2014a). Specifically, the HM 
Group’s production system is comprised of most assembly processes; the Group’s 
automobile-related affiliates supply the core auto-components. Automakers and 
module makers can play crucial roles in the keiretsu-based IPS (Kim 2014b). In 
this vein, HMC and KMC are in charge of the production and general assembly of 
automobiles, and Hyundai Mobis (hereafter, MOBIS) and Hyundai Wia 
Corporation (hereafter, WIA) are responsible for the development and production 
of core modules. 
The automakers and module makers maintain an “exclusive supply 
relationship” within the HM Group. Based on this relationship, MOBIS and WIA 
are fully responsible for supplying core modules to HMC and KMC. The 
exclusivity of the relationship between MOBIS and WIA and the constituent 
companies of the HM Group is the result of the increased importance of modules as 
automotive components. As such, module makers have become more important 
within the HM Group, as the need for modules has increased. Moreover, 
automobile-related affiliates of the HM Group work as a single unit in the 
framework of the keiretsu-based IPS, thereby strengthening the supply relationship 
between automakers and module makers. 
Figure 8 illustrates the nature of an exclusive supply relationship between the 
HM Group’s automakers’ global business sites and the HM Group’s module 
makers. HMC maintains nine business sites in eight countries. All of these business 
sites, with the exception of the Sichuan Hyundai Motor Company (CHMC)xvi in 
China, are in exclusive supply relationships with MOBIS’s global business sites. 
Moreover, three of the four of KMC’s business sites are in similar exclusive supply 
relationships with MOBIS. In general, HMC and KMC’s global business sites have 
set structures whereby they are supplied with core modules by MOBIS’s global 
business sites. 
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FIGURE 8: An exclusive supply relationship between an automaker and a module maker 
in the HM Group 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
 
Given this, an exclusive supply relationship relates to the association between 
automakers and module makers within the HM Group. This exclusivity is 
characteristic not only of the relationship between the Korean sites of HMC and 
KMC and MOBIS and WIA, but also in the respective relationships between their 
global business sites. By providing modules to HMC and KMC at both their 
domestic and overseas sites, MOBIS and WIA facilitate a reliable module supply 
route to ease operation of the OPS. 
4.2. Non-technical factors (II): joint advances into overseas markets with the 
HM Group’s parts suppliers  
Although securing the appropriate modules is a critical component of successful 
automobile production and assembly, the HM Group’s acquisition of other, equally 
important auto-components is no less critical. This issue is integral not only for the 
HM Group, but for other automakers (e.g., Toyota Motor Corporation [TMC] and 
General Motors [GM]) as well. To enter the global market more aggressively and 
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to increase their global production capacities, automakers sought to expand their 
overseas production facilities. Specifically, when these automakers established 
their global production networks, they built them in such a way to minimize 
differences in the production conditions of their domestic and overseas production 
facilities.xvii For example, GM established its global production networks through 
alliances, mergers, and/or acquisitions of existing companies and their production 
facilities in local countries (Bordenave & Lung, 2003). Unlike GM, TMC 
constructed and developed its overseas production facilities, and receives essential 
auto-components for the overseas production of its automobiles from local parts 
makers as a means to minimize costs (Park, 2013).  
 
TABLE 3:The number of Korean auto parts makers in eight countries in 2013 
(Unit: 1 company) 
 
No. of companies 
Total 
China India Brazil Russia Slovakia Czech Turkey U.S 
[A] 333 63 11 8 19 13 7 52 506 
[B] 28 6 1 1 1 – 1 3 41 
[C] 42 7 3 1 1 4 1 10 69 
[D] 14 – – – – – – 2 16 
[E] 5 2 – – – – – 2 9 
[F] 17 – – – – – – – 17 
Total 439 78 15 10 21 17 9 69 658 
Notes: [A]: manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and engines; [B]: manufacture of 
parts and accessories for motor engines; [C]: manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicle 
body; [D]: manufacture of power transmission for motor vehicles; [E]: manufacture of engines for 
motor vehicles; [F]: manufacture of electrical equipment for motor vehicles. 
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, Foreign Investment Statistics. 
 
The HM Group has implemented its global production networks in a manner 
similar to TMC’s strategy in some respects, but its procurement of autocomponents 
for its overseas production facilities is quite different in other ways. The HM 
Group has established its overseas production facilities itself, rather than through 
mergers and/or acquisitions. Moreover, HM Group’s production facilities in local 
countries are supplied not by local parts makers, but by Korean auto parts makers 
who have also advanced into overseas markets (Park, 2013). Table 3 illustrates the 
number of Korean auto parts makers who have moved into the eight countries in 
which the HM Group’s overseas production facilities are located. As of 2013, there 
are 658 Korean auto parts makers in these countries, the largest proportion of 
which has moved into China. 
According to HMC’s 2014 Sustainability Report, the number of auto parts 
suppliers that provide components to HMC and KMC’s global production facilities 
has gradually increased over time. The number of first-tier suppliershas increased 
from 17 in 1997 to 239 in 2013; the number of second-tier suppliers has increased 
from 17 in 1997 to 360 in 2013. One motivation for the HM Group’s advancement 
into overseas markets with auto parts makers is the stabilization of the automobile-
production process. The HM Group has historically lacked the organizational 
capacity to make use of the local resources in the overseas markets into which it 
moved. Joint advancement into overseas markets with parts makers assuages the 
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effects of this issue. In addition, joint advancement into overseas markets reduces 
HM Group’s production costs by lowering the price of parts (Jung, 2011).As a 
result of the HM Group’s global business strategy, parts suppliers that provide core 
auto-components to the HM Group have gradually advanced into many parts of the 
world where the HM Group has business sites.  
4.3. Technical factors (I): the HM Group’s automobile-production method  
The HM Group’s production structure, which involves roughly 25,000 
components supplied by various auto parts makers, is not a static one. Instead, the 
HM Group’s assembly and production practices are based on two methods: the 
“module-based assembly method” and the “platform sharing-based assembly 
method.” 
 
  
FIGURE 9: HMC’s and KMC’s amount of raw materials purchased per vehicle 
Notes:1. RAWPVt = (∑ HMC’s RAWt + ∑ KMC’s RAWt) / (∑ HMC’s DPt + ∑ KMC’s DPt) (t = 
2004, …, 2013) where, RAWPVt: amount of raw materials purchased per vehicle in the year t, RAWt: 
amount of raw materials purchased in the year t, DPt: domestic production in the year t. 2. “4Steel 
makers” is comprised of Hyundai Steel, Hyundai Hysco, Hyundai BNG Steel, and Samwoo. 3. Total 
raw materials purchased includes materials purchased from both affiliates and non-affiliates. 
Source: Computed by the author by using the data from each company, Auditor's Report, Annual 
Report. 
 
The module-based automobile assembly method is based on the notion that 
some automobile parts are assembled by complex modules. Automakers in the HM 
Group assemble complex, module-type components into each part of its 
automobiles (Kim 2014a; 2014b). It is difficult to comprehend the HM Group’s 
ratio of modules per automobile, but it seems that the process of assembling 
vehicles through a module-based process is increasing in popularity. The basis for 
this assumption hinges on the fact that HMC and KMC have increased the amount 
they spend on parts supplied by MOBIS and WIA relative to parts supplied by 
other auto parts affiliates. Figure 9 clearly illustrates two issues. First, the changing 
patterns of HM Group’s purchasing behavior with respect to raw materials per 
vehicle are very similar to HMC’s and KMC’s purchasing behavior (from MOBIS 
and WIA). Second, HMC and KMC are purchasing more material per vehicle from 
MOBIS and WIA every year; this is not the case for the material they purchase 
from other parts suppliers. Taken together, these two issues indicate that HMC and 
KMC are utilizing modules to assemble automobiles to a greater degree each year. 
In addition, the size of the purchases that HMC and KMC make from other parts 
affiliates tends to be smaller than the purchases they make from MOBIS and WIA. 
This further suggests that there has been a gradual increase in the use of modules to 
assemble automobiles. 
The platform sharing-based automobile assembly method is one in which a 
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large number of automobile models are produced by a small number of automobile 
platforms. In 2002, HMC and KMC produced 28 different models of automobiles 
with 22 platforms; there were no integrated platforms at this time. By 2013, 
however, the HM Group was using only six integrated platforms to produce 40 
models of automobile. From 2002 to 2013, the HM Group reduced the number of 
platforms it used by 16, but increased the number of models it could produce by 12 
(See Table 4). By enabling production of various automobile models through the 
use of a small number of integrated-platforms, the HM Group has been able to 
diversify its automobile models to address new trends in a quickly changing global 
market. 
 
TABLE 4:The number of platforms and integrated-platforms in the HM Group 
(Unit: 1 EA, 1 model, 1 vehicle) 
 2002 2009 2011 2013 2002–2013 
No. of platforms      
   Integrated-Platforms 0 6 6 6 +6 
   Platforms 22 12 5 0 –22 
   Total 22 18 11 6 –16 
No. of models      
   Total 28 32 36 40 12 
Production volume      
   Domestic 2,574,039 2,744,055 3,476,175 3,449,590 +875,551 
   Overseas 129,439 1,901,721 3,140,683 4,152,855 +4,023,416 
   Total 2,703,478 4,645,776 6,616,858 7,602,445 +4,898,967 
Source: Hyundai Motor Company (2012), Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc. Korean 
Automobile Industry, Hyundai Motor Company, Sustainability Report, Annual Report, Kia Motors 
Corporation, Kia Motors Sustainability Magazine, Annual Report. 
 
4.4. Technical factors (II): Just-in-Sequence production system in MOBIS 
According to MOBIS’s 2014 Annual Report, the company has the Just-in-
Sequence (JIS) production system to supply three major modules to HMC and 
KMC. The JIS production system is a module-supply system in which automobiles 
and their necessary modules are simultaneously produced by their respective 
companies, thereby allowing module makers to address automakers needs 
immediately. 
Figure 10 illustrates MOBIS’s JIS production system in cooperation with 
HMC’s Korean production facility (Asan Plant). When an automobile production 
order is entered into the computer system at HMC’s Asan Plant, the module 
production process on MOBIS’s production line is immediately synchronized with 
the automobile assembly process on HMC’s production line. The total time 
required for MOBIS to produce, assemble, load, and transport the cockpit module 
is 90 minutes. During this time, separate assembly processes are occurring on 
HMC’s production lines. The finished cockpit module is fitted to HMC’s 
automobile, which is in production at that time. In total, it takes 101 minutes for 
HMC to issue an order for a module, have the module delivered, and include the 
module in the assembly process. 
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FIGURE 10: The JIS production system in MOBIS: the case of the cockpit module 
Source: Reconstructed by the author by using the figure from Jung (2008). 
 
Though similar at first blush, MOBIS’s JIS system differs from TMC’s Just-in-
Time (JIT) production system. The key feature of this difference relates to whether 
MOBIS maintains its module stock. The JIT production system, which primarily 
seeks to minimize costs associated with carrying inventory, facilitates the reception 
of parts exactly when they are needed (Monden, 2012). To facilitate the smooth 
operation of the JIT production system, parts suppliers must maintain a fixed 
quantity of stock to supply components to automakers exactly when those 
components are needed and not before. This minimizes the degree to which 
automakers are forced to maintain inventory of those components in their plants. 
In contrast, MOBIS is able to maintain low levels of stock through the JIS 
system because when automobile assembly begins on automaker’s production line, 
module production for a corresponding automobile model simultaneously begins 
on module maker’s production line (Jung, 2008). When an automobile production 
order is made, the order information is simultaneously offered to both MOBIS 
(who supplies module A) and HMC (or KMC). Therefore, module A is produced 
while HMC (or KMC) assembles the automobile of which it will be a part. Because 
module A is delivered to HMC (or KMC) immediately after it is completed (and 
when it is needed), stock of module A is reduced or eliminated outright. 
For MOBIS’s JIS production system to work effectively, it is important for 
MOBIS’s production plants and automaker production plants to be geographically 
proximal. Proximity facilitates the timely delivery of the module. That MOBIS 
established its production plants near HMC’s (or KMC’s) production plants 
indicates MOBIS’s dedication to the effective operation of the JIS production 
system. MOBIS’s decision to locate its facilities near those of HMC and KMC are 
driven by the fact that HMC and KMC purchases most core modules from MOBIS. 
The nature of this supply chain can be explained by the HM Group’s unique 
production system, the keiretsu-based IPS. Moreover, geographic proximity 
between MOBIS’s production plants and HMC’s (or KMC’s) production plants 
occurs not only in Korea, but in overseas markets as well. Specifically, none of the 
HM Group’s global facilities are more than 51 km away from MOBIS plants. As a 
result of this geographic proximity, the JIS production system is equally effective 
both within Korea and among the HM Group’s overseas facilities. 
4.5. Minimizing difference in automobile-production conditions 
Design, Assembly, Production (101 minutes) 
Production order 
  
Automobile 
plant 
(HMC) 
Transport, 
Installation 
  
 
Module 
plant 
 
Receive 
production order 
Loading 
process 
12 Km 
Assembly (46 minutes) (10 minutes) 
Receipt of 
Sequence 
 
Wiring Crash 
 
Cluster Cockpit Module Uncompleted Vehicle Completed Vehicle 
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To ensure the smooth operation of the OPS in the HM Group’s facilities, 
differences in production systems in the corporation’s Korean and overseas 
production facilities should be minimized. Although region-specific factors make 
the complete similarity of production systems in Korean and overseas production 
facilities impossible, the HM Group has attempted to mitigate the effects of the 
inherent differences. 
Both non-technical and technical factors are important for minimizing the 
differences inherent to the production conditions of domestic and foreign facilities 
within the HM Group’s newly evolved-production structure. The HM Group has 
secured two key supply routes to minimize differences in global production 
facilities. The first is module-supply route based on an exclusive supply 
relationship in the keiretsu-based IPS. The second is a parts-supply route secured 
through joint advancement into overseas markets with auto parts suppliers. By 
securing each of these supply routes, global HMC and KMC production sites can 
receive essential auto-components and modules for automobile production from 
overseas facilities. 
In addition, the HM Group is now producing automobiles at its various global 
business sites, adopting both module-based automobile assembly and platform 
sharing-based automobile assembly methods, based on the JIS production system. 
Asthese assembly methods have simplified the automobile assembly process, HMC 
and KMC have been able to produce their automobiles at their overseas sites in a 
manner similar to their production of automobiles at their Korean sites. 
In sum, by minimizing the differences in production conditions among the 
global business sites of the HM Group, production and assembly of automobiles at 
those sites can move forward smoothly. As a result, the HM Group is capable of 
evolving such that it effectively adopts the OPS, which allows it to directly supply 
its automobiles to overseas markets through various overseas business sites.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to describe the HM Group’s newly evolved-
production structure and reveal the effect of various factors on the structure’s 
evolution. In doing so, we have highlighted the specificity of Korea’s domestic 
automobile market, which is aggressively occupied by two Korean automakers—
HMC and KMC. In addition, we have explained that the delay in the widespread 
diffusion of the passenger vehicle caused the HM Group to maintain the DPS until 
only recently. Through the use of PSSI scores, we also showed that the HM 
Group’s production structure transformed to the OPS in 2012. 
Through our analysis, we have found that the leading factor which drove the 
HM Group to transform to the OPS was the complementary growth of automobile 
markets in EEs and demand saturation for brand-new, Korean-brand passenger 
vehicles within Korea’s domestic automobile market. Moreover, the smooth 
operation of the HM Group’s newly evolved-production structure is largely 
dependent on minimizing the differences in production conditions inherent to the 
Group’s domestic and overseas production facilities. Factors that affect the 
minimization of these differences include both non-technical (i.e., securing 
module-supply routes based on exclusive supply relationships, securing auto parts-
supply routes through joint advancement into overseas markets), and technical (i.e., 
module-based automobile assembly, platform-sharing-based automobile assembly 
method, the JIS production system) factors. 
Despite these findings, this study suffers from some limitations. To address 
these limitations, further study of the socio-technical components associated with 
the transformation of production systems is needed. As Fujimoto argued, “while 
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virtual1y al1 the assembly plants in Europe and America are adopting some 
versions of Japanese lean production system, the very company which created the 
lean system concept, Toyota, is now adopting socio-technical components into its 
lean system, whether intentional1y or unintentionally” (Fujimoto, 2000; p. 303). 
In addition, although our discussion is relatively extensive in this paper, we 
have not explicated the “escape period from the DPS” at great length. Future 
research in this domain should attend to this period when discussing the evolution 
of the HM Group’s production process. To do so, it is necessary to compare the 
Korean automakers with other countries’ automakers. Looking at the production 
structure transformation process through a comparative analysis involving the 
Toyota Group, it may be possible to conclude that the companies’ respective 
evolution processes are relatively similar.xviii Despite these potential similarities, 
however, the period of escape from the DPS differs in two key ways. 
The first difference relates to timing. The HM Group entered the period later 
than the Toyota Group (2006 vs. 1995; see Table 5). On one hand, this indicates 
that the HM Group maintained a DPS longer than the Toyota Group. Although this 
may be perceived as a positive, it also indicates that the transition to the OPS was 
delayed for the HM Group. Korean government policies intended to promote the 
automobile industry, coupled with the imposition of high tariffs on BFA, provided 
the HM Group with conditions that made the Group’s long-term focus on the 
domestic market advantageous. 
The second difference between the HM Group and the Toyota Group relates to 
the length of time they stayed in the “escape period from the DPS.” Whereas the 
HM Group was in the escape period for only six years, the Toyota Group remained 
in the escape period for 14 years (see Table 5). Because the HM Group was in the 
escape period for a shorter period of time than the Toyota Group, it can be 
concluded that the HM Group’s production structure transformation was faster than 
the Toyota Group. The speed of the HM Group’s transformation may be 
attributable to the streamlined production processes practiced by all entities within 
its production system (based on the keiretsu-based IPS). In this way, the HM 
Group has not only established stable conditions for producing its automobiles at 
overseas production facilities in a short period of time, it has also shortened the 
time required for expanding its production facilities. As a result of these changes, 
the transformation of the HM Group’s production structure was a relatively quick 
endeavor. 
The HM Group’s production structure has gradually evolved over time, and is 
likely to continue to evolve in response to a dynamic global automobile market. 
Given its capacity to evolve, the HM Group’s corporate system is well-equipped to 
effectively and strategically with changes in factors that affect manufacturing, 
employment, and corporate governance structure. In this way, the HM Group has 
created its own unique corporate system that is distinct from the systems used by 
other companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JEPE, 2(2), W. J. Kim, p.235-261. 
257 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 
 
TABLE 5:Global output of automobiles, PSSI: the HM Group vs. the Toyota Group 
(Unit: 1 vehicle) 
  Hyundai Motor Group   Toyota Group  
 
Overseas 
output 
Domestic 
output PSSI Period 
Overseas 
output 
Domestic 
output PSSI Period 
1985 – – – – 136,307 4,313,622 0.939  
1986 – – – – 152,524 4,317,800 0.932  
1987 – – – – 192,260 4,301,651 0.914  
1988 – – – – 244,371 4,693,144 0.901  
1989 – – – – 471,581 4,732,581 0.819  
1990 – – – – 677,655 4,949,239 0.759  
1991 – – – – 669,917 4,845,831 0.757  
1992 – – – – 764,466 4,620,865 0.716  
1993 – – – – 888,714 4,192,992 0.650  
1994 – – – – 1,051,292 4,066,070 0.589  
1995 – – – – 1,253,424 3,731,368 0.497  
1996 – – – – 1,346,033 4,023,973 0.499  
1997 – – – – 1,390,071 4,129,471 0.496  
1998 – – – – 1,467,565 3,761,727 0.439  
1999 – – – – 1,611,195 3,819,355 0.407  
2000 – – – – 1,751,442 4,156,570 0.407  
2001 98,908 2,365,089 0.920  1,801,059 4,046,746 0.384  
2002 129,439 2,574,039 0.904  2,175,135 4,138,879 0.311  
2003 193,856 2,498,648 0.856  2,581,499 4,244,375 0.244  
2004 415,959 2,693,469 0.732  3,094,336 4,454,268 0.180  
2005 743,116 2,788,930 0.579  3,620,924 4,611,076 0.120  
2006 1,009,754 2,768,557 0.465  3,932,186 5,085,601 0.128  
2007 1,161,958 2,825,441 0.417  4,378,123 5,119,631 0.078  
2008 1,457,268 2,728,732 0.304  4,313,375 4,911,861 0.065  
2009 1,901,721 2,744,055 0.181  3,691,240 3,543,199 –0.020  
2010 2,604,762 3,160,056 0.096  4,510,008 4,047,343 –0.054  
2011 3,140,683 3,476,175 0.051  4,374,627 3,483,464 –0.113  
2012 3,635,467 3,490,946 –0.020  5,489,282 4,420,158 –0.108  
2013 4,152,855 3,449,590 –0.093  5,826,622 4,290,652 –0.152  
Notes: 1. If 1≧ PSSI ≧0.5:  (maintaining period of the DPS); if 0.5 > PSSI ≧ 0:  (escape period 
from the DPS); if 0>PSSI:  (transitional period to the OPS). 2. Data for the Hyundai Motor Group are 
comprised of constituent data from the Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Motors Corporation. Data for 
the Toyota Group are comprised of constituent data from the Toyota Motor Corporation, Daihatsu 
Motor Co., Ltd, and Hino Motors, Ltd. 
Source:Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, Korean Automobile Industry,Hyundai Motor 
Company,Sustainability Report,Annual Report,Kia Motors Corporation Kia Motors Sustainability 
Magazine,Annual Report, Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., Motor Vehicle Statistics 
of Japan,Monthly report on the Japanese automobile industry, Toyota Motor Corporation (1988), 
Toyota Motor Corporation (2012). 
 
Notes 
i The HM Group owns two automakers. One is Hyundai Motor Company, which separated 
from Hyundai Group in September of 2009. The other is Kia Motors Corporation, 
which was acquired by HMC in October of 1998. 
ii  These data are taken from Hyundai Motor Company, Annual Report, Kia Motors 
Corporation, Annual Report. 
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iii PSSIt = (∑DPt – ∑OPt) / (∑DPt + ∑OPt) where DPt is domestic production in the year t 
and OPt is overseas production in the year t 
iv KMCP means previous KMC that was not merged into the HM Group. 
v See Kim (forthcoming). 
vi The president of the HM Group, Mong-Koo Chung, presented four global strategies in 
2001. These strategies were collectively referred to as glocalization. 
vii “Multinational corporations are normally considered as giant firms engaged in productive 
actives of corporate nature with headquarters located in one definite country and having 
variety of business operation in different countries in broad-based manner” (quoted in 
Saleem 2006; 414). “A multinational or transnational enterprise is an enterprise that 
engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or, in some way, controls value-
added activities in more than one country” (quoted in Dunning &Lundan, 2008; 3). “A 
multinational firm sends abroad a package of capital, technology, managerial talent, and 
marketing skills to carry out production in foreign countries” (quoted in Spero & Hart 
2003; 462-63). 
viii These data are taken from Hyundai Motor Company, Annual Report. 
ix SCIt = (∑Productiont – ∑Salest) / (∑Productiont + ∑Salest) where Productiont is domestic 
production in the year t and Salest is sales in the domestic market in the year t 
x In general, vehicles are grouped into various categories according to their use, size, and 
engine displacement. Among various classification standards, the “segment” classifies 
vehicles according to their size and price. Segment-based classification is common in 
the United States and Europe. In Europe, segments are defined by the length of the 
vehicle. These segments are called: A-segment (less than 3,500mm); B-segment (less 
than 3,850mm); C-segment (less than 4,300mm); D-segment (less than 4,700mm); E-
segment (less than 5,000mm); F-segment (more than 5,000mm); S-segment (sport 
coupes); M-segment (multi-purpose vehicles); and J-segment (sport utility vehicles). 
xi These data are taken from FOURIN, Inc. (2013). 
xii These data are taken from FOURIN, Inc. (2013). 
xiii These data are taken from AssociaçãoNacional dos Fabricantes de VeículosAutomotores 
(2014). 
xiv These data are taken from FOURIN, Inc. (2013). 
xv Computed by the author using the data from focus2move.com 
xvi  Sichuan Hyundai Motor Company is an HMC global business site that primarily 
produces commercial vehicles. Established in 2013, CHMC is in an exclusive supply 
relationship with Hyundai Dymos China. 
xvii Fujimoto (1997b) presents various hypotheses and analytic frameworks to explain why 
differences in production patterns have emerged among firms that utilize the Lean 
Production System paradigm. 
xviii See Kim (forthcoming). 
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